



Woodard & Curran



# Lowell Water Utilities –

---

## SCADA Upgrades





# About The Presenters

---

## Tim Maynard

- Technical Manager – Woodard & Curran
- 18 years experience in the design, programming and implementation of control systems in the industrial, manufacturing, food and beverage, municipal and industrial water/wastewater markets.


## Evan Walsh

- Engineering Supervisor – Lowell Water
- Grade 7-C Operator, 10 years assisting in Operational Support at the facility.

# Lowell Water Utilities – SCADA Upgrades Agenda

---

- Project Overview Goals
- Existing SCADA System Architecture
- Proposed SCADA System Architecture
- Remote Access Approach
- Summary and Conclusions



# Lowell Water Utilities – Project Motivation

- 3 Main Goals for the project:
  - Operational Efficiencies
  - Risk Management
  - Long Term Cost Savings





# SCADA Remote Access - Efficiency

- Real Time Access/Feedback
  - Diagnose issues before sending personnel onsite
  - Ease of maintenance tasks at remote facilities
- Enable troubleshooting when access is challenging (e.g. weather)
- Emergency situations can be evaluated instantaneously
- Ordinance employees can be the first line of response to reduce call-ins and overtime costs
- Integration with other software to maximize use (HACH WIMS, CMMS, etc.)



# SCADA Remote Access - Risk Management

## ➤ Acceptable Risk

- False sense of security
  - Air-gapped systems still vulnerable
- Security Maintenance Team (Lowell Water, MIS, & W&C)
  - Three-layered support team
  - Strength at all three levels



## ➤ Risk Ownership

- Responsibility for accepting risk associated with Lowell's water infrastructure belongs to the Water Utility Executive Director

## ➤ Centralized User Management

- Managing SCADA access privileges



# SCADA Remote Access - Risk Management

- Managing and operating two utilities that are physically separated
  - SCADA Manager, Maintenance Superintendent, and Operation Superintendents
- Improved operational awareness minimizes consequence of failures
  - Public health and safety
  - Environmental damage
  - Equipment cost



# SCADA Remote Access - Cost Savings

## ➤ Staffing

- Operations staff can be deployed more effectively
- Reduce overtime costs and off hour call-ins
- Connect systems together eliminates redundant SCADA manager positions

## ➤ Contracted Services

- Support from contractors can be drastically reduced

## ➤ Hardware

- Less expensive hardware at each node; easier to replace
- Longer lifecycle and lower cost





# SCADA Definitions - Alphabet Soup


## Acronyms

SCADA – Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition

PLC – Programmable Logic Controller

HMI – Human Machine Interface

DMZ – Demilitarized Zone




# Existing SCADA Networks

## ➤ Water

- 2 redundant SCADA nodes (development node and runtime node)
- 3 client nodes in control room and lab

## ➤ Wastewater


- 2 redundant SCADA nodes (development node and runtime node)
- 12 client nodes, at strategic locations throughout the facility






# Existing SCADA Networks

- Large Flat Networks
- Each SCADA node is a full Windows PC
  - Often an additional PC on an employee's desk
  - Update requirements
  - Hardware Cost/labor to replace
- Software licensing is costly
- Manual Access To Data



# Existing SCADA Networks


- Updates can only be done from the Development Node
  - Updates need to be manually copied to the clients
- False Sense of Security





# Proposed SCADA Networks


- Server/client architecture for HMIs to promote expandability and versatility
- Securely provide data to external systems (ex: CMMS)
- Facilitate access to all facilities from common resources (e.g. SCADA Manager)
- Secure remote access to facilities



# Proposed SCADA Networks

## Network Architecture


- The Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture is used to define industrial networks today
- Segment network into levels and zones
- Access policies for data to traverse levels






# Proposed SCADA Networks – Server/Client Architecture

- Two redundant servers, located in secure locations
- Engineering workstation (not pictured) for server administration and programming
- Thin client hardware at all other current locations, including main SCADA nodes in control rooms



# Proposed SCADA Networks – Server/Client Architecture


- Thin client hardware costs ~\$500 and operates for 4-6 years
- Server hardware operates for 8-10 years
- Does not run a native OS, so does not become obsolete
- Hardware replacement in 10 minutes, as opposed to 4-8 hours
- Lower long-term maintenance costs






# Proposed SCADA Networks - Remote Access

- DMZ & firewall facilitates secure remote access to SCADA networks
- Multifactor authentication used for added security
- Remote access privileges restricted by user requirements
- Ability to monitor and audit system activity (accountability)
- May disconnect facility firewall and inhibit remote access without affecting SCADA operations



# DMZ Architecture – Industry Standard


- Used to move data into and out of a secure zone of a network
- Traffic not allowed to pass directly between business and ICS networks
- Traffic must terminate in DMZ
- Hardware/software in DMZ facilitates required communication as needed






# Proposed SCADA Networks - DMZ

- Robust firewall (Cisco ASA) protects SCADA network, including intrusion prevention and anti-malware capabilities
- Server(s) in DMZ can make SCADA data available elsewhere
  - Provide data to CMMS or other systems
  - External systems do not communicate directly with PLCs
  - Aggregate logs
- Server(s) in DMZ can bring in external data without exposing control to untrusted networks
  - Facilitate patching
  - Bring files into network



# Proposed SCADA Networks – DMZ Server Functions


- **WSUS** – Windows server role facilitates patching on ICS network
- **AV Console** – Managed antivirus on ICS assets
- **SIEM** (Security Information & Events Manager) – Log aggregation and analysis
- **Jump Host** – Choke point for remote connections to ICS network
- **File Transfer** – Manage files in/out of ICS network
- **Data Connector** – Connection for future CMMS or other systems





# Proposed SCADA Networks – City Network Access

- Users/devices/software in the City's network can access data from the SCADA system
- SCADA assets are not directly exposed to external networks
- Users in common location may access data from multiple facilities





# Project Challenges/Lessons Learned

---

- Work with your IT/MIS group closely
- Technology/Regulations are constantly changing
- Buy in from Staff changing their day to day workflow
- Technology is not cheap...find the solution that meets your goals without breaking the bank
- Identify other needs that can be done in parallel

# Summary and Conclusions

- Upgrade SCADA computer networks at both utilities
- Develop architecture to support an integrated water utility
- Utilize industry standard equipment and protocols to provide secure remote access to SCADA assets
- Provide means to better integrate current City software and applications with real-time SCADA data
- Capitalize on strong in-house technical capabilities and trusted SCADA/cyber security consultant
- Realize quantifiable cost savings and operational efficiencies





# Questions / Discussion

---

